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THE CISG AFTER MEDELLIN V. TEXAS:
DO U.S. BUSINESSES HAVE IT?
DO THEY WANT IT?
Mark Cantora*

INTRODUCTION

The Convention on the International Sale of Goods (the "CISG") is a
multilateral uniform sales treaty adopted at a diplomatic conference in Vienna
in 1980.' The objectives of the CISG, as outlined in its preamble, are to
"remove legal barriers to international trade and promote the development of
international trade." 2 In practice, the CISG is a set of default rules developed
for the purpose of maximizing and streamlining efficient international trade.3
The Convention is commonly understood to have entered into force for all the
states a party to it, on January 1, 1988. 4
Two assumptions about the CISG have prevailed since it supposedly
came into force in the United States.5 The first assumption concerns the very
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publication. Special thanks to my advisor, Professor Norman Silber, and my Notes and Comments
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Christopher Richins and Vanessa Tiradentes, for all of his invaluable assistance, without which, this
note would never have been prepared for publication. I would also like to express my sincerest
gratitude to my parents, James and Elizabeth Cantora, for supporting me in all my endeavors.
Finally, I would like to dedicate this note to Tamar Katz-we both know that all my
accomplishments are only possible because of you.
mUnited Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Final Act (Apr. 10,
h
1980), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/18, Annex I (1980), reprinted in S. Treaty Doc. No. 98-9, 9 8d Cong.,
at
(1980),
also
available
Legal
Materials,
668
Ist Sess., and in 19 Int'l
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/sales/cisg/CISG.pdf [hereinafter "CISG"].
2 Id.
3 See generally Id.; Nicholas G. Karambelas, International Sale of Goods: An International Law as
Domestic Law, WASHINGTON LAWYER, Apr. 2009, at 27 (noting that the CISG is a set of "uniform

and coherent" default rules).
4 CISG, supra note 1.
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law: Status-1980: United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, available at
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meaning of the phrase "came into force in the United States." Since 1988, the
U.S. courts that have not ignored the CISG altogether have assumed that the
CISG is self-executing, and have therefore assumed that the CISG has come
into force in the U.S. without the need for any congressional action. 6 The
second prevailing assumption is that the CISG is efficient and beneficial for
U.S. businesses engaged in the international sale of goods.7 Most treatises and
commentators have either assumed the CISG's benefits by explicitly stating so
or by ignoring the question of the CISG's usefulness altogether. 8
On March 25, 2008, the Supreme Court majority in Medellin v. Texas
arguably asserted a new standard for determining the self-executing status of all
international treaties to which the U.S. is a signatory. 9 This new standard has
thrown into doubt the self-executing status of the CISG.' 0 This note will argue
that because of the ruling in Medellin v. Texas, the two prevailing assumptions
about the CISG must be reexamined. 1 Both the status of the CISG and the
benefits accruing from the CISG's implementation will be examined for the
purpose of answering two simple questions: (1) Is the CISG a self-executing
treaty in force in the U.S. and (2) Do U.S. businesses want it to be?
Before the analysis begins, however, the scope of this article must be
explicitly defined. First, this article is not a general analysis of the history of
the Supreme Court's interpretation of self-executing and non-self-executing
treaties. This topic has been covered extensively in many books, treatises, and
articles by eminent jurists and commentators, and any analysis of that history in
this article would be superfluous and unnecessary.'2 It suffices to say that the
opinions of both the majority and the dissent in Medellin approach the

http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral-texts/sale goods/
1980CISG_ status.html.
6 See Claire R. Kelly, The InternationalSale of Goods: The Back and Forth of the CISG and
InternationalLaw, A.L.I.-A.B.A. Continuing Legal Education-The U.C.C. and Beyond: Current
Developments in Commercial Law, SN086 ALI-ABA 47 (2008).
7 See Gilles Cuniberti, Is the CISG Benefitting Anybody?, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1511 (2006).
' See id.
9 Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1356 (2008).
ld. at 1361.
Io

See generally Posting of Jeremy Telman to Contracts Law Prof Blog: Medellin and Contracts
Revisited 11,http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/contractsprofblog/2008/04/medellin-and--1 .html
(Apr. 8, 2008).
12 See, e.g., 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 69697 (1833), available at http://www.constitution.org/js/js-,000.htm; Carlos Manuel Vasquez, The
FourDoctrines of Self Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 695 (1995); Martin S. Flaherty,
History Right?: HistoricalScholarship, OriginalUnderstanding,and Treaties as "Supreme Law of
the Land", 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2095 (1999); John Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual
and StructuralDefense of Non-Self-Execution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2218 (1999).
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interpretations of a treaty's self-executing status from the two major, yet
divergent, historical theories of treaty interpretation, and in the end, the
Medellin majority's theory is now the new dominant theory in force.
Second, this article is not an analysis of the efficiency of the CISG
the
parties include a "choice of governing law" provision in their
when
contracts. Every analysis in this article assumes that the parties have not
included any provisions in their contract providing for a specific governing law.
In a hypothetical world where the parties do not include a contractual provision
for a specific governing law, and where the CISG is not in force in the United
States, the default rules of the Uniform Commercial Code (the "U.C.C.") would
be applied. Therefore, this article compares the efficiency of the CISG's default
rules against the U.C.C. default rules that would be applied if the CISG was not
in force.
Finally, this article concludes that (a) pursuant to the Medellin
decision, the CISG is a self-executing treaty and is in force as such in the
United States today, and (b) even when compared to the U.C.C. default rules
hypothetically applicable to international sales of goods in the absence of the
CISG, the CISG is economically efficient and beneficial for U.S. businesses.

I. MEDELLIN AND SELF-EXECUTION
Because the CISG has been assumed to be self-executing by nearly all
U.S. courts and commentators, 13 any ruling on the definition and understanding
of "self-executing" has the potential to have an enormous impact on the CISG.
Therefore, the Medellin analysis of "self-execution" must be studied in order to
reveal whether or not the CISG ever was, or is now, self-executing.
At first glance, the Medellin majority's opinion seems to never clearly
state that a treaty requires an actual statement within the treaty, explicitly
declaring the treaty to be "self-executing." ' 14 However, ambiguity is inserted
into the analysis by the dissent's misreading of the majority's statement that a
treaty must "convey an intention" to be self-executing.15 In coming to the
conclusion that a treaty must convey an intention to be self-executing, the
majority cites Igartua-De La Rosa v. United States.' 6 However, the court in
Igartua is presumably the first court to make the leap from the original
understanding of the Supreme Court that the language itself must "act directly

13

See Kelly, supra note 6.

14 Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1356 (2008) (holding that in order to be self-executing a

treaty need only convey an intention to be so).
15 Id.

16 Id.
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on the subject [of the treaty], 17 to the understanding that a treaty must "convey
an intention" to be self-executing. 18 This seems to show that the dissent's
theory that the Court's opinion requires explicit language in the text acting
directly on the subject19 could be logically and interpretively correct.
The interpretation of this major part of the majority's opinion turns
completely on the understanding of the word "convey." Since in this context
the word "convey" is not a legal term of art, the plain meaning of the word can
be derived from its standard definition. 20 Merriam-Webster defines "convey" as
meaning "to impart or communicate by statement, suggestion, gesture, or
appearance.", 21 Therefore a "conveyed" intention need not be explicit in a text
in order to be present; to be a conveyed intention, that intention may be
implied.22
Of course, the Medellin majority's standard is the new precedent to be
followed by all future courts. However, the majority's and dissent's divergent
opinions on the proper interpretation of the majority's standard is a source of
ambiguity and, when applied in the future, could lead to completely opposite
outcomes. Therefore, these two questions must be analyzed in order to properly
understand the implications the Medellin majority's standard will have on the
CISG: Does the CISG language convey an intention that the treaty is selfexecuting (a) pursuant to the majority's own characterization of its standard,
and (b) pursuant to the dissent's understanding of the majority's standard?
A. Is the CISG Self-Executing under the Majority's Own Interpretation of
Its Standard?
The CISG is self-executing under the majority's own interpretation of
its expressed standard. After emphatically stating that the treaty language itself
is of the utmost importance in interpreting the nature of a treaty,23 the majority
goes on to state that neither its cases nor its standard requires a "talismanic"

17Foster v. Nielson, 27 U.S. 253, 314-15 (1829).

'8Igartua-De La Rosa v. U.S., 417 F.3d 145, 150 (1st Cir. 2005) (improperly citing Foster v.
Nielson for the contention that in order for a treaty to be self-executing, it must convey an intention
to be so).
'9See Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1380 ("[Tloday's majority looks for language about 'self-execution'
in the treaty itself, and.., it erects 'clear statement' presumptions...").
20 No law dictionaries include a definition for the word "convey" as it is used in this context.
21 http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/convey.
22 "Imply" being a synonym for "Suggest." See http://www.merriamwebster.comdictionary/suggesting.
23 Medellin, 128 S.Ct. at 1356-57.
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word in the text in order for a treaty to be found to be self-executing.24 The
majority's explanation of its own standard (and its refutation of the dissent's
interpretation of its standard) shows that the language of the treaty must convey
25
an intent to be self-executing, but that it must not necessarily do so explicitly.
The majority's opinion, when understood on its own terms (as even the dissent
points out), 26 considers numerous treaties to be self-executing even when they
lack specific and explicit language on the matter of self-execution. 27 In the
words of the majority, "[W]e have held treaties to be self-executing when the
textual provisions indicate that the President and Senate intended for the
agreement to have domestic effect., 28 The majority also states that it will look
secondarily to the negotiation and drafting history of the treaty, and to the postratification understanding of the treaty.29
Therefore, in order to determine if the CISG is self-executing, the
analysis must start with an examination of the text of the CISG in order to
determine whether it contains provisions indicating its drafters intended for the
agreement to have immediate domestic effect and to be self-executing.
There are only two specific sections in the CISG which could be
understood to speak to the issue of the CISG's self-executing status: the
preamble and article 99(2).
The Preamble
The preamble of the CISG broadly states the purposes, objectives, and
goals of the treaty.3 ° However, attempting to find language in the preamble of
the CISG that would be dispositive to proving that the CISG is self-executing is
problematic because the preamble does not contain the oft-used phrases that
tend to prove either self-execution or non-self-execution, such as "the states
may" or "the states shall" or "the states will undertake to."'3 1 The preamble
merely states that "the States Parties to this Convention ... Have Agreed as
follows. ' 32 This statement is ambiguous and can be interpreted to mean that the
24 Id. at 1366.
25

id.

26 Id. at 1381 ("Indeed, the majority does not point to a single ratified United States treaty that

contains the kind of 'clea[r]' or 'plai[n]' textual indication for which the majority searches.").
27 Id. at 1363, 1368.
28 Id, at 1364 (emphasis added).
29 Id.

at 1357.

30 CISG, supra note 1.
31 See id. at 1358-59 (discussing interpretations of "must" and "shall," and "undertake" in a larger

discussion of Article 94 of the UN Charter).
32 CISG, supra note 1.
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states agree to execute the convention and make it part of their domestic law, or,
conversely, that the states agree that upon ratification the convention is
immediately in force as law. Unfortunately, the preamble does not provide any
interpretive guidance because it does not contain any language that the treaty
conveys, either explicitly or implicitly, an intention to be self-executing.
Article 99(2)
Article 99(2) addresses when and how the CISG comes into force for
each state. It reads:
When a State ratifies, accepts, approves or accedes to this
Convention after the deposit of the tenth instrument of
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this
Convention, with the exception of the Part excluded, enters
into force in respect of that State, subject to the provisions of
paragraph (6) of this article, on the first day of the month
following the expiration of twelve months after the date of the
deposit of its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval
or accession.33
Article 99(2) could be read to assert that after the deposit of the
instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession, the CISG will
"come into force." If construed this way, it would necessarily follow that the
CISG was meant to be self-executing for each state where the CISG was
ratified, accepted,
approved, or accessed, after the tenth state ratifies the
34
convention.
However, Article 99(2) must be read in light of the relevant passage in
Article 7 of the CISG. Article 7 states that "[i]n the Interpretation of this
Convention, regard is to be had to its international character., 35 Reading Article
99(2) within the context of Article 7 could be interpreted to implicitly mean that
the drafters of the CISG understood that, because the CISG is a multilateral
international treaty, all signatory states have multiple and varying ways of
bringing a treaty into force as domestic law within their own legal system.36

33 id.

Posting of Antonin I. Pribetic,
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/contractsprof-blog/2008/04/medellin-and-3

.html (April 9,2008,

12:42:54 EST).
-5 CISG, supra note 1,
art. 99.
36

id.
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The listing of the four options-ratification, acceptance, approval, accessioncould be meant to imply that the convention comes into force with respect to
37
that state only after the treaty is also approved in that state's own unique way.
However, the very ambiguity of this section, and the equal possibility that the
section could be construed either way, proves that the section does not meet the
Court's requirement that a treaty provision either explicitly or implicitly convey
an intention to be self-executing.
The clear ambiguities within the only two sections that could possibly
speak to the issue of self-execution means that, pursuant to the majority's
opinion, recourse must be had to the "secondary" interpretive tools: the drafting
history and the post-ratification understandings of the treaty. 38
Recourse to the drafting history can be quickly discarded as an
interpretive tool.
A thorough search of the drafting history reveals no
interpretive guidance for determining whether or not the CISG is selfexecuting. 39 Therefore, according to the majority's opinion, the only tool left to
determine whether the CISG is self-executing is the U.S. government's postratification understanding of the CISG.4 °
It seems significant that in the "Message from the President of the
United States to the Senate about the United Nations Convention on Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods," the President stated that, "[t]he Convention
is subject to ratification by signatory States (Article 9 1(2)), but is self-executing

37 For example, no one would make the argument that the CISG cannot come into force within a

state if that state signs the CISG and its local rules do not have procedures equivalent to the four
listed. If that state had its own procedures for bringing the CISG into force, the CISG would be
considered in force in that state once those procedural requirements are satisfied regardless of the
fact that the state's procedures do not fit exactly into one of the four categories listed in Article
99(2).
38 Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1357 (2008) ("Because a treaty ratified by the United States

is 'an agreement among sovereign powers,' we have also considered as 'aids to its interpretation' the
negotiation and drafting history of the treaty as well as 'the postratification understanding' of
signatory nations.").
39 See generally United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
Vienna 10 March - April 11 1980: Official Records, Documents of the Conference and Summary
Records of the Plenary Meetings and of the Meetings of the Main Committees JX 1977 .A2
AICONF. 97/19 (New York: United Nations, 1981); JOHN 0. HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF THE UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES (Deventer, Netherlands: Kluwer, 1989).
40 Technically, the Court requires an examination of the "post-ratification understanding of
signatory nations." See Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1357. However, the post-ratification understandings
of signatory nations other than the United States are unhelpful in providing any guidance for
whether or not the U.S.'s domestic legal system considers the CISG self-executing or non-selfexecuting. Therefore, the U.S. government's post-ratification understanding of the CISG's
executory status is the only signatory nation's understanding that is relevant in this particular
context.
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and this requires no federal implementing legislation to come into force
While this does not fit neatly into the category
throughout the United States.'
of a "post-ratification understanding," it clearly conveys the intention of the
President and the Senate for the treaty to be self-executing. 42
The President's statement on the CISG's self-executing status, the
Senate's ratification of the CISG with full knowledge that the President
understands the CISG to be self-executing, and the ambiguous nature of the
preamble and Article 99(2) that could point to the self-executing nature of the
treaty, all act as strong evidence that the CISG will still be considered selfexecuting pursuant to the Medellin majority's interpretation of its own
standard.43
B. Is the CISG Self-Executing According to the Dissent's Interpretation of
the Court's Standard?
The Medellin dissent interprets the Court's holding to mean that the
treaty language itself must explicitly state an intention to be self-executing in
order for the treaty to be considered self-executing." Thus, because it has been
shown that the language of the CISG does not explicitly convey any intention to
be self-executing, the dissent's interpretation of the majority's standard would
render the CISG non-self-executing.45

41 Message from the President of the United States to the Senate Transmitting the United Nations

Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Sept. 21, 1983, S. Treaty Doc. No.989 (1983). See also Posting of Jeremy Telman to Contracts Law Prof Blog: Medellin and the CISG,
http:/awprofessors.typepad.con/contractsprof-blog/2008/03/medellin-and-th.htmul (Mar. 26,
2008).
42 See Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1367 (implying that the intention of the President and the Senate
is
dispositive of the nature of the treaties executory status. See also John D. Gregory, Implementing
the Electronic Communications Convention: Ratification Isn't What It Used to Be, 18-FEB Bus. L.
TODAY 43.
43 Contracts Law Prof Blog: Medellin and the CISG,
http:/flawprofessors.typepad.com/contractsprof - blog/2008/03/medellin-and-th.html (Mar. 26,
2008).
44 Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1389 (noting the dissent's understanding that the majority's standard
requires "explicit textual expression about self-execution" in order for a treaty to be considered selfexecuting).
41 Id. at 1383-84 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (expressing fear that the Court's holding would undermine
multiple important international treaties that, until the Medellin decision, were considered selfexecuting).
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C. The CISG Is Self-Executing
It is clear from an examination of the Medellin majority's and the
Medellin dissent's different interpretations of the majority's holding, that under
the majority's interpretation the CISG would be considered self-executing,
while under the dissent's interpretation the CISG would be considered non-selfexecuting. Had the majority merely stated its holding without addressing the
proper interpretation of its holding, the dissent's analysis would most likely
have had a very significant effect on future applications of Medellin. However,
because the majority explicitly addressed how its holding should be understood
and applied, the majority's explanations on the proper application of its own
holding will very likely be the dominant analysis used by U.S. courts in future
cases involving treaties and the determination of their status as self-executing or
non-self-executing.
Thus, future courts properly applying the majority's
standard must necessarily understand the CISG to be self-executing. Pursuant
to the Court's holding in Medellin v. Texas, the CISG is a self-executing treaty
in full-force in the United States today.

II. THE BENEFITS OF THE CISG: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
The economic analysis of law provides a system to study the efficiency
of the law.46 Economists define an efficient transaction as one47 in which at least
one person is made better off while no one is made worse off.
In his article, "The Problems of Social Cost," Ronald Coase argues
that, regardless of the initial assignments of property rights, the freedom of
contract will efficiently distribute property rights to the owner who most values
them. 4 8 Known popularly as the Coase Theorem, Ronald Coase's theory
46

See RICHARD POSNER,

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 1-10 (2007).

47 This kind of efficient transaction, where at least one person is made better off and no person is

made worse off is called "Pareto-superior efficiency" or "Pareto efficiency." See id. Many
economists, finding the pareto-superior concept too strict and unrealistic, use a concept of efficiency
where a transaction is efficient if at least one person is made better off and the people who are made
worse off actually are or theoretically could be compensated from the ones made better off. This
kind of efficiency is called "Kaldor-Hicks efficiency" or "potential Pareto efficiency." See Guido
Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: CarryingCoase Further, 100 YALE L.J. 1211, 1221-22
(1991) ("[A] move is efficient whenever the winners win more than the losers lose, in the sense that,
if the winners compensated the losers to their satisfaction, the winners would still be better off than
they were before the change ... This test is sometimes called potential Pareto superiority...").
Regardless of which concept of efficiency is used, it is economically true and logically intuitive that
a transaction making at least one person better off while not making any people significantly worse
off is a beneficial and "good" transaction.
18 Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, J. L. & ECON. (1962). Dr. Coase explains that, in a
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hypothesizes that these property rights will be allocated in this efficient way
when the parties come together and make contracts.
Therefore, many
economists have argued that the entire point of the laws of contracts should be
to decrease ex-ante 49 transaction costs which would discourage the act of
contracting, in order to efficiently allocate property rights to their most valued
and most valuable use.50
In order to decrease these transaction costs,
economists have advocated enacting laws that would mimic "what the parties
would have wanted" had they actually bargained for the specific provision and
possessed full information. 51 These economists have argued that these
"majoritarian rules ' 52 would allow the majority of parties to spend less money

negotiating these provisions in their own private transactions.53
However, in 1989, law scholar Ian Ayres and economist Robert
Gertner outlined a groundbreaking theory arguing that there is another
important goal of contractual rules when those rules are "default rules" as
opposed to "immutable rules."

54

Immutable contract rules, such as the restriction against contractual
provisions disclaiming obligations of good faith or care,55 are rules from which
there can be no derogation.5 6 Parties cannot vary these rules by contract, and

world where there are no transaction costs, the person who puts the most value in something will
pay for the opportunity to have that thing that he or she values.
49 "Ex-ante" is an economics term meaning "before the transaction." Its corollary term is "ex-post"
meaning "after the transaction." See Online Glossary of Research Economics: Ex-ante,
http://www.econterms.com/glossary. cgi?query=ex-ante; Online Glossary of Research Economics:
Ex-post, http://www.econterms.com/glossary.cgi?query=ex-post.
50 Cuniberti, supra note 7. Cuniberti analyzes the CISG's ability to reduce transaction costs and
concludes that the CISG is not efficient from a Law and Economics perspective.
5 Full information merely means the full amount of information relevant and related to the
particular transaction at issue. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook & David R. Fischel, The
Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1410 (1989) (proposing a general theory on the economic
efficiency of default rules that mimic what the parties in a transaction would have chosen with "full
information and costless contracting.").
52 "Majoritarian rules" is the economics phrase encompassing the concept of contractual rules and
laws that mimic what "most parties would have wanted had they actually negotiated the provision."
See CASs R. SUNSTEIN, BEHAVIORAL LAW AND EcONOMICS 139 (illustrated ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 2000).
53See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 51.
54 Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989).
5 See U.C.C. § 1-302(b) (1978) ("The obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness, and care
.. may not be disclaimed by agreement."). See also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205
("Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance
and enforcement.") (emphasis added).
56See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 54, at 88 ("Immutable rules cannot be contracted around.").
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any contractual provision that runs counter to these immutable rules will not be
enforced. 57 Because today's free-market society is based on the freedom of
individuals to make bilateral and multilateral exchanges through bargaining,58
and immutable rules necessarily restrict this freedom, the overwhelming
majority of contemporary rules of contract are "default rules." 59
Default rules are contract laws that will be applied in the absence of a
contractual provision to the contrary. 60 However, when the parties include a
provision in a contract that derogates from the default rule, the contractual
provision prevails as the "private law" between the parties.61
Ian Ayres's and Robert Gertner's 1989 theory, known popularly as the
Ayres-Gertner Model, argues that while all immutable rules and some default
rules should be majoritarian, there are other defaults that should be designed to
induce at least one party to a contract to "draft around" the default rule, in order
to openly clarify the parties' preferences in the transaction.62 Furthermore, they
argue that the goal of default rules should not solely be to lower transaction
costs, because transactions costs are not the only impediments to complete
contracts.63
The following section will first explore the different goals of default
rules.
It will then apply these goals to five of the most important
concepts/provisions in contract analysis, in order to determine whether these
rules are (1) majoritarian defaults or penalty defaults, and (2) economically
efficient or economically inefficient.
A. Transaction Cost Reducing Defaults
When two parties make a contract in a commercial transaction, their
ultimate goal is to make a deal that will result in benefits for both parties. In a
perfect world, the two parties would have the ability to come together and
quickly make a deal without spending any significant amount of time, money,
or resources. In that perfect world, the contract would cover every possible
contingency, so that any litigation arising from a breach of the contract would
57 See id. ("[Immutable rules] govern even if the parties attempt to contract around them.").
58E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 5 (Aspen Publishers 2004) (noting that exchange in the

"mainspring" of our economic system of free enterprise).
59 Id. at 37 ("[Tlhe great bulk of the general rules of contract law, including those of the Uniform
Commercial Code and the Vienna Convention [the CISG], are subject to contrary provision by the
parties.").
60 Ayres & Gertner, supra note 54, at 87.
61 id.
62

Id. at 92-93.

63 Id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2009

11

Journal of International Business and Law, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 8
THE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS & LAW
be instantaneously solvable by reference to the pertinent provision in the
contract.
Moreover, because every provision of the contract is both
"obligationally complete" and "contingently complete," the publicly subsidized
court system would have little involvement, and thus the contract would impose
the bare minimum amount of social costs 64 onto the taxpayers.65
However, in the real world, valuable amounts of time, money, and
resources are spent in the simple act of drafting and completing a contract.
These transaction costs, including ex-ante legal fees, can become so large that
they deter parties from spending much, if any, time properly drafting and
negotiating the contract provisions covering the rights, duties, obligations, and
legal exigencies involved in the business deal.66 This, in turn, can result in even
greater costs for both the parties and society as the courts spend large amounts
of time and money determining an equitable and efficient outcome of litigation
in which a party breaches a provision of an incomplete contract.
Therefore, in order to get closer to the "perfect world" of complete
contracts, lawmakers have enacted gap-filling default rules tailored to what the
majority of parties "would have wanted" had they actually spent time
negotiating those particular provisions. 67 These "majoritarian" default rules
have the benefit of reducing transaction costs by bestowing on the parties the
benefit of these rules as if they had bargained for them, without requiring the
parties to expend the large amount of money, time, or effort that is typically
needed to get these provisions memorialized into the deal. However, more
recent scholarship has shown that transaction costs are not the only issues
lawmakers should be concerned with when drafting default gap-fillers.

64 "Social Costs" is an economics term referring to the overall cost of an economic activity on the

welfare of society. See Online Glossary of Research Economics: Social Costs,
http://www.economist.com/research/economics/alphabetic.cfm?letter=S#socialbenefitscosts. In the
context of this article, the generally referred to social costs are mainly the citizen tax-dollars spent
on maintaining and operating the justice system.
65 "Obligationally Incomplete" is a law and economics term referring to "contracts in which [all]
the obligations are not fully specified." See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual
Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729, 730 (1992). "Contingently
Incomplete" is an economics term referring to "contracts that fail to fully realize the potential gains
from trade in all states of the world." See id.
66 Transaction costs can include any costs that are associated with the deal making process
(including the contract drafting) before the signing of the contract. These costs can include, but are
not limited to, lawyer's fees, time-value, and human resources and their associated expenses.
67 Ayres & Gertner, supra note 54.
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B. Information Forcing Defaults
Since the early 1990's, law and economics scholars have focused more
of their attention on the importance of default rules that do exactly the opposite
68
of "what the parties would have wanted" had they bargained for the rule.
These default rules are structured in such a way that the parties will be forced to
"contract around" the default rules in order to avoid being penalized by the
harsh results of the rule.69
For example, assume A is a manufacturer and seller of widgets and B
is a purchaser of these widgets. Further assume that a contract for the sale of
100 widgets is negotiated between A and B, but they fail to specify a price for
the widgets in the contract. In subsequent litigation over a breach in the
contract, the court would easily be able to determine a "reasonable" price for
the widgets "that the parties would have wanted" by looking to the market price
of widgets at the time that the contract was concluded.
However, assume instead that the contract included a provision
specifying that B agreed to buy widgets from A for the price of $1.00 per
widget, but the parties failed to include in the contract the number of widgets to
be purchased. In subsequent litigation, how would the court determine the
quantity of widgets that both parties would have wanted had they bargained for
the amount in the contract? 70 There is no equivalent to "market value" when it
comes to determining quantities. Therefore, having no default rule at all in
these circumstances would be inefficient for the parties, and a "majoritarian"
default rule would be both impossible and inefficient. In this situation, the most
efficient solution for the parties involved, and for society at large, would be a
default rule that is so harsh it would stand out and force the parties to take
notice and provide the relevant and necessary information by contracting
around the rule in order to avoid the harsh results of the default rule. 7'
The CISG, as mentioned above, is made up almost entirely of default
rules. 72 There is no indication in the legislative history as to whether or not the

68 Id.
69

Id.

70 At the very least, the subsequent litigation would require hours, if not days, of testimonial and

physical evidence of what the parties claim they contracted for, common business practices, and
past business arrangements between the parties.
71Ayres & Gertner, supra note 54.
72 The only mandatory rules of the CISG are found in Article 12. CISG, supra note 1,art. 12 ("Any
provision of article 11,article 29 or Part II of this Convention that allows a contract of sale or its
modification or termination by agreement or any offer, acceptance or other indication of intention to
be made in any form other than in writing does not apply where any party has his place of business
in a Contracting State which has made a declaration under article 96 of this Convention. The parties
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rules were drafted using only the majoritarian standard or if the drafters took
into account the equal importance of penalty default rules. 73 The legislative
history gives no guidance to determine whether or not the CISG drafters even
took efficiency into account when drafting the CISG. However, there is a
method to determine general efficiency of the CISG as a whole. This method
requires a comparison of the CISG and the U.C.C.
The U.C.C. is the standard set of (mostly) default rules applied for all
commercial sales transactions in the United States.74 When the CISG is not
applicable to commercial sales transactions in goods, U.S. courts generally
apply the U.C.C. 75

An examination of the efficiency of five of the most

important contract rules, 76 and a comparison of how the CISG and U.C.C. apply
these rules can be used to determine whether or not the CISG is more or less
efficient than the CISG. Therefore, if the U.C.C. is determined to be more
efficient and beneficial for U.S. businesses, the CISG would necessarily be
inefficient for, and detrimental to, U.S. businesses.
The Statute of Frauds
The first statute of frauds was enacted in England in 1676 for the
purpose of preventing fraud in contractual dealings.77 The English original, and
its American common-law progeny, traditionally required that any contract, in
order to be enforced in a court of law, must be memorialized in writing.78 The

may not derogate from or vary the effect of this article.").
73Most likely, if the drafters of the CISG even took economic efficiency into account, they applied
the majoritarian approach to the CISG's default rules. The CISG was drafted throughout the late
1970's, when the majoritarian approach was the dominant view and the Ayres-Gertner model on
penalty defaults was not yet published.
74See FARNSWORTH, supra note 58, at 33, 37 (noting that Article 1H
of the U.C.C. is generally
applied to all domestic sales transactions ingoods and is made up of mostly default rules).
75Before 1988, US businesses engaged ininternational sales transactions in goods were generally
still subject to the U.C.C. This would have continued to be the case were the CISG not in force in
the United States. See id. at 33-35 (noting that the U.C.C. generally applies to domestic sales
transactions in goods, but the CISG generally displaces the U.C.C. for international sales
transactions).
76 These rules are the statute of frauds, the parol evidence rule, "foreseeability of damages" rules,
price term rules, and quantity term rules.
77 Language and Law: Statute of Frauds (1677),
http://www.languageandlaw.org/TEXTS/STATS/FRAUDS.HTM.
78 The original statute referred only to contracts in land, but modem statutes of frauds based on the
English original have been applied to numerous other transactions, including contracts for the sale
of goods. See generally JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS, § 19.1 (5th
ed. 2003) (explaining the general history of the Statute of Frauds and its relation to similar
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statute of frauds does not fit perfectly into the model of "gap filling" defaults.79
Its purpose is not to fill in a specific contract term that the parties left out of
their negotiated contract. Rather, the purpose of the statute of frauds is to
encourage parties to actually put their contracts in writing.
Clearly, the statute of frauds is not a majoritarian default. When
parties come together to negotiate a deal, their logical preference is to have any
deals made between them, including non-written ones, be enforceable in a court
of law. 81 Rendering a contract non-enforceable simply because it was not
memorialized in writing is not "what the parties" would have wanted when they
entered the deal. Quite the opposite, parties normally want all their contracts,
regardless of their forms, to be enforced.
Therefore, the statute of frauds must operate as either an Ayres-Gertner
model information forcing penalty default, or merely as an economically
inefficient default rule. At first glance, it would seem as though the statute of
frauds was the ideal version of a penalty default. It seems to operate in such a
way that the penalty for failing to put contractual provisions in written form is a
completely useless and unenforceable contract. Such a harsh consequence
seems to force the parties to take notice and contract around the default by
putting the provisions of the contract in writing. 82 But a closer look at the

American statutes).
79 Economist Eric Posner would most likely not consider the statute of frauds a contractual gapfilling default rule because the statute of frauds "does not fill a gap in an otherwise valid
contract..." Eric A. Posner, There Are No Penalty Default Rules in ContractLaw, 33 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 563, 578 (2006) (explaining that only doctrines which fill gaps in otherwise valid contracts
are "true" gap-filler default rules). But see Ian Ayres, Ya-Huh: There Are and Should be Penalty
Defaults, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 589, 593 (2006) ("[Ilf the operation of a rule is functionally
equivalent to a default, it is both acceptable and advisable to analyze it as a default.").
80This encouragement is formally known as the Statute of Fraud's "evidentiary" and "cautionary"
functions. See Monroe H. Freedman, Contracts:An Introduction to Law and Lawyering 338
(unpublished casebook, on file with author).
81 Otherwise, why make any contract in the first place? If people came together and negotiated
contracts, without any expectation that the contracts would have the force of law behind them, their
thinking would be rather similar to Charles Marlow in the novel Heart of Darkness when he says,
"It occurred to me that my speech or my silence, indeed any action of mine, would be a mere
futility." JOSEPH CONRAD, HEART OF DARKNESS 66 (Penguin Classics 1995).

82The statute of frauds in U.C.C. § 2-201 is actually rendered a default rule because it can be varied
by agreement and contracted around pursuant to U.C.C. § 1-102(3). However, "contracting around"
the statute of frauds default actually results in complying with the very rule one is attempting to
contract around, since in order for there to be a written contract provision expressly not requiring
the contract terms be written, it is assumed that there is an existing written contract to which this
provision can be added, thus rendering the provision that "contracts around" the statute of frauds
essentially pointless, and the attempt to "contract around" the statute of frauds in the traditional
sense unintelligible.
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language of the rule as found in the U.C.C. shows that the U.C.C.'s statute of
frauds default rule 83 fails to force the parties into providing any useful
information whatsoever. U.C.C. § 2-201(1) states:
Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract for the
sale of goods for the price of $500 of more is not enforceable
by way of action or defense unless there is some writing
sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made
between the parties...
This provision proceeds to explain that the only term that need be
written in order to satisfy the U.C.C.'s statute of frauds is the quantity of
goods. 85 The official comments further elaborate that the writing need only
"afford a basis for believing that the offered oral evidence rests on a real
transaction." 86 Even an indication of which party is the buyer and which party
is the seller is not needed to satisfy U.C.C. § 2-201(1).87
At the expense of raising ex-ante transaction costs, 88 penalty defaults
are meant to force the parties to provide important and significantinformation
that would lower the otherwise high ex-post litigation costs for both the parties
and the publicly subsidized court system. 89 But the statute of frauds fails to
force the parties to provide any important information whatsoever. 90 The terms
of all traditional and modem statutes of frauds, and more specifically, the
U.C.C.'s typical version of the statute, allows a valid contract be so informal

83 The U.C.C. statute of frauds is supplemented by common law understandings and legal concepts

related to the U.C.C. provision at issue, including the common law analysis of the statute of frauds.
See U.C.C. § 1-103 (1978) ("Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles
of law and equity.., shall supplement its provisions.").
84 U.C.C. § 2-201 (1978).
85 Id. ("A writing is not insufficient because it omits or incorrectly states a term agreed upon but the
contract is not enforceable under this paragraph beyond the quantity of goods shown in such
writing.").
86 U.C.C. § 2-201, Official Comment 1 (1978) (commenting that even a contract "written in lead
pencil on a scratch pad" may satisfy the statute of frauds).
87

Id.

88

Michael Braunstein, Remedy, Reason, and the Statute of Frauds:A CriticalEconomic Analysis,

1989 UTAH L. REV. 383, 426 n.154 (1989) ("Certainly, to the extent that a writing requirement
raises transaction costs it will make some contracts too expensive to be worthwhile.").
89 Of course, the "social costs" would be significantly lowered if all contractual litigation were
settled by private court systems funded by the litigants themselves. However, in the current system
of a publicly subsidized judicial system used for litigating contract disputes, the social costs of
litigation are of primary importance in any economic analysis of laws and default rules.
90 The sole exception being the quantity, discussed infra.
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and incomplete that it is ineffectual at both preventing fraud (its original
justification) 91 and providing any of the information that would lower ex-post
litigation costs. The actual result of the statute of frauds is higher transaction
costs for the parties with no significant decrease in ex-post litigation costs or
social costs. The statute of frauds as used in the U.C.C. is at best superfluous,
and at worst, an inefficient default rule.
92
The CISG expressly rejects any version of the statute of frauds.
Article I I of the CISG states, "A contract of sale need not be concluded in or
evidenced by writing and is not subject to any other requirement as to form."93
This language stands in stark contrast to the U.C.C.'s insistence that a contract
be evidenced in at least "some kind" of writing. 94 The CISG's rejection of the
statute of frauds in its entirety is completely consistent with efficiently reducing
transaction costs for the parties while recognizing that unless every provision of
a contract is required to be in writing, the statute of frauds increases ex-ante
transaction costs without reducing any of the ex-post court costs or litigation
costs. The CISG's rejection of the statute of frauds default is economically
efficient for U.S. businesses engaged in international transactions.
The Parol Evidence Rule
The parol evidence rule requires that if the parties put all or part of
their agreement in writing, they may not contradict the terms of the written
agreement with evidence from either a prior oral or written agreement, or an
oral agreement made contemporaneous with the signing of the written
agreement. 95 The parol evidence rule is similar to the statute of frauds in that
they are both provisions dealing with writings in general, however unlike the
statute of frauds, the parol evidence rule is properly categorized as a classical
example of a majoritarian default.
If parties to a contract were to invest all the ex-ante transaction costs
involved in sitting down and memorializing their contract in writing, it would
be illogical to assume that "what they want" is the ability of the contract to be
contradicted by other outside agreements made before or contemporaneous to
the signing of the written agreement. Even if the written agreement is of the
most minimalistic type, there is no reason to believe that the parties would want
the few provisions that they incurred transaction costs in drafting to be easily

91
92

Braunstein, supra note 88, at 426.
CISG, supra note 1, art. 11.

93 id.
94 See U.C.C. § 2-201 (1978).

95Freedman, supra note 80, at 532.
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contradicted. 96 Instead, the parol evidence rule gives the parties the benefit of
their contract term's definiteness without requiring the parties to actually incur
the transaction costs of negotiating and drafting this type of provision into the
contract itself.
The U.C.C.'s version of the parol evidence rule 97 allows for a written
agreement to be explained or supplemented by evidence of consistent additional
terms agreed to prior, contemporaneous, or after the signing of the written
contract. 98 The U.C.C.'s inclusion of these exceptions makes the rule a reliable
and efficient majoritarian default. 99
Despite its proven utility, the CISG rejects the parol evidence rule. t °°
Article 11 of the CISG states that "[a] contract ...may be proved by any
means, including witnesses.' ' 01t As opposed to its economically efficient

96

For example, if the parties drafted a contract containing only a provision specifying the quantity

of goods to be sold, there is no reason to believe that these parties would want this one written term
to be so amorphous that it could be directly contradicted by some other agreement written prior (or
some other oral agreement made contemporaneous) to the signing of "one-provision" contract. To
the contrary, if the parties made the conscious decision that the transaction costs were worth the
benefits to memorializing this one specific provision in the written contract, it would be irrational to
assume that any person would want the benefits of those incurred transaction costs easily erased by
simply presenting evidence of another agreement. The very act of their agreeing to memorialize the
term in the first place, negates the possibility that either party did not actually want that term to be
the true evidence of their agreement.
97 U.C.C.

§ 2-202 (1978).

98 If the Court finds evidence that the parties intended the writing to have been a complete and
exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement, no extrinsic evidence will be allowed to explain
or supplement the contract. U.C.C. § 2-202(b). This provision is majoritarian in that it requires the
court to look to what the parties wanted or would have wanted in the situation.
99 For example, assume that A is a seller and B is a buyer of widgets. A and B write a contract
stating that A will sell B 10 widgets for $1.00 each. Further assume that A sells and B buys many
different types and kinds of widgets. In subsequent litigation, assume that A wants to present
evidence of another written agreement made between A and B prior to the signing of the written
contract for the sale of widgets. This agreement defines what type of widgets A and B are
contracting for, and without this writing, the definition of "widgets" is unexplained and
unambiguous. Pursuant to the U.C.C.'s exceptions to the parol evidence rule, most courts would
allow this prior written agreement to "explain and supplement" the ambiguous written contract.
However, assume that instead of a written agreement defining "widgets," A wants to present a prior
written agreement as evidence that "widget" in the contract actually meant "banana." This prior
written agreement directly contradicts the exact provision that the parties spent time and effort
negotiating. Therefore, pursuant to the U.C.C.'s parol evidence rule and consistent with
economically efficient majoritarian default rules, most courts would not allow into evidence this
prior written agreement contradicting a written provision of the contract.
10oCISG, supra note 1, art. 11.
101 Id.
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exclusion of the statute of frauds, 10 2 the CISG excludes a classic majoritarian
rule which reduces both the ex-ante transaction costs of the parties, and the expost litigation costs to the parties and society. The CISG inefficiently rejects an
economically efficient default in the form of the parol evidence rule.
Forseeabilityof Damages
Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner first pointed out in their article, "Filling
Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules," that the
limiting of consequential damages to only damages "that the party in breach did
not have reason to foresee as a probable result of the breach when the contract
was made,"' 103 operates as an information forcing penalty default, not as a
classic majoritarian default. 1°4 The Hadley default is a purposeful inducement
for the more informed party to reveal the information about possible
consequential damages to the party that could most efficiently prevent these
damages at a lower cost (the "least-cost avoider").' 1 5 While this article cannot
give a detailed explanation of the intricate and complicated game-theory
analysis 10 6 done on the Hadley rule by Ayres and Gertner, and other economic
game-theorists, Ayres and Gertner's eventual conclusion is that the Hadley rule
limiting recovery only 07to foreseeable damages operates as an information

forcing penalty default. 1

102 Ironically, the CISG's economically efficient rejection of the statute of frauds and its

economically inefficient rejection of the parol evidence rule are contained within the same exact
provision. See id.
103 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 351(1). The U.C.C. applies the Restatement's
understanding of "foreseeability." See also FARNSWORTH, supranote 58, at 795 ("[T]he loss need
only have been foreseeable as a probable.., result of the breach.")
"04 See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 54, at 101 ("The Hadley default of denying unforeseeable
damages may not be consistent with what fully informed parties would have wanted.").
105 Id. ("In Hadley a miller in Gloucester contracted with a carrier to have a broken crank shaft
transported to Greenwich. The shipment was delayed, and the miller sued the carrier for
consequential damages of the profits lost while the mill was inoperative. The court, holding that
only foreseeable consequential damages should be awarded, reversed a damage award and
remanded for a new trial."). See Least Cost Avoider, http://home.uchicago.edu/jmellisfleast%20cost%20avoider.html.
'06 Game theory is a complex economical and mathematical technique for analyzing how parties
should behave in certain strategic situations where certain parties may react in numerous different
ways to other parties' actions. See Economist.com: Research Tools: Economics A-Z: Game Theory,
http://www.economist.coml research/ economics/ searchActionTerms.cfm?query=game+theory
(last visited April 08, 2009).
107 Ayres & Gertner, supra note 54. See also Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual
Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729, 735 (1992) ("[T]he
limitation on consequential damages [in Hadley] was a 'penalty' or 'information forcing' default
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The U.C.C. and the CISG seem to apply the same Hadley standard
limiting the recovery of consequential damages. However, a slight difference in
the language of the CISG renders the actual meaning of the CISG completely
different than both the U.C.C. and the Hadley rule.
Most courts and commentators agree that the U.C.C., in accord with
the rule in Hadley'0 8 and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 1° 9 requires that
consequential damages are only recoverable when the breaching party had
reason to know that the damages were "probable" to result from the breach.11 °
It has been assumed that CISG's provision limiting consequential damages to
only those that are foreseeable is also in accord with the Hadley rule.11'
However, Article 74 of the CISG reads:
Damages for breach of contract by one party consist of a sum
equal to the loss, including loss of profit, suffered by the other
party as a consequence of the breach. Such damages may not
exceed the loss which the party in breach foresaw or ought to
have foreseen at the time of the conclusion of the contract...
12
as a possible consequence of the breach of contract.'
At first glance, this difference seems negligible. However, the
difference between "probable" and "possible" has the potential to lead to
extremely different results. Under the U.C.C.-Hadley rule, the party that is
well-informed about future risks is induced to reveal that information to the
party that can more efficiently prevent these future risks at a lower cost. Under
this rule, the well-informed party is only required to reveal information about
"probable" consequences and risks. Any losses caused by damages that have
less than a 50% chance of being a consequence of the breach cannot be
recovered!113
rule.").
105Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng.Rep. 145 (1854) ("Where two parties have made a

contract which one of them has broken, the damages which the other party ought to receive in
respect of such breach of contract should be such as may fairly and ... reasonably be supposed to
have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the contract, as the probable
result of the breach of it.").
109Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 351 ("Damages are not recoverable for loss that the party
in breach did not have reason to foresee as a probable result of the breach when the contract was
made.").
11

FARNSWORTH, supra note 58, at 795-96.

.. Id. at 796 n.21 (citing Delchi v. Carrier SpA v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024 (2d Cir. 1995)
(explaining that the CISG follows the foreseeability rules of Hadley)).
112CISG, supra note 1,art. 74 (emphasis added).
113For example, assume that a manufacturer of widgets contracts with a carrier to transport the
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However, under the CISG scheme, the well-informed party is required
to reveal information about any "possible" consequences and risks. 114 The
inclusion of the word "possible," as opposed to the word "probable," introduces
an entirely new foreseeability of damages concept that is entirely at odds with
the traditional Hadley rule. Thus, under the CISG's rule, only losses caused by
damages that had absolutely no chance of being a consequence of the breach
cannot be recovered."t 5 This rule effectively expands the transaction costs
infinitely, since the well-informed party is encouraged to strategically inform
the least-cost avoider of every possible consequence of every possible breach,
so that the well-informed party can recover all the damages which the least-cost
avoider had the knowledge or the reason to know of as being possible
consequences of its breach. Thus, far from efficiently forcing a party with
relevant information to give this information to the least-cost avoider, the CISG
rule encourages a party with relevant information to exponentially increase
transaction costs by negotiating for provisions covering an almost infinite
amount of contingencies in the hope that the other party will breach and the
well-informed party may recover an extremely large amount of consequential
damages.
The CISG's foreseeability rule would be efficient if it were
consistently construed as being identical to the U.C.C.-Hadley rule. However,
because of the CISG's use of the word "possible" instead of "probable," the
CISG's forseeability rule induces the well-informed party to increase
transaction costs.

widget factory's main conveyor belt to a new factory that has no conveyor belt. Without this
conveyor belt, the factory cannot make widgets. If the manufacturer informs the carrier that the
factory would lose at least $100 dollars for every day that the conveyor belt is late in getting to the
factory and the carrier delivers the conveyor belt one day late than specified in the contract, the
carrier will be liable for $100 dollars because he knew or had reason to know that the delivering the
conveyor belt one day late would probably result in the manufacturer losing of at least $100 dollars.
"4 CISG, supra note
1, art. 74.
115Assume the same facts as in footnote 107. But in addition to the manufacturer's probable loss of
$100 dollars for the one day delay, assume that the manufacturer also informed the carrier that for
every day the conveyor belt is not delivered on time, the factory would lose $1,000,000 because the
factory was planning on using its' eamings from the new factory in order to buy New York megamillions lottery ticket. Although the carrier had reason to know that this could be a consequence of
the breach, it is not a "probable" consequence of the breach, and thus under the U.C.C and Hadley,
these losses would not be recoverable as consequential damages. However, because these losses are
"possible" (even if the possibility is very slight), Article 74 of the CISG allows the manufacturer to
recover these damages. See CISG, supra note 1,art. 74.
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Price Terns

Price terms are considered to be one of the two most fundamental
aspects of any contract." 6 Therefore, any economic analysis of contractual
default rules would be incomplete without an exploration of the rules'
treatments of price terms.
U.C.C. § 594 reiterates that a contract may be validly concluded even
if it does not contain a settled price term.' 17 The section goes on to state a
classic majoritarian default rule: "In such a case [where a contract is concluded
without settled price terms] the price is a reasonable price at the time for
delivery. . .

."8

This default rule requires that when no price term is specified

in a contract, the courts, in ex-post litigation, will supply a "reasonable
term."l" 9Typically, this reasonable term will be based on market prices for the
goods at the time that the contract was signed. 20 This rule operates as a
majoritarian default because an overwhelming majority of self-interested parties
would (and do) negotiate for the market price when buying or selling
products. 2' This rule eliminates the ex-ante transaction costs of complex
negotiations for every price term detail. A reasonable price typically based on

116The other being quantity terms, discussed infra. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 54, at 594
("Quantity and price are the two central terms of any contract.").
117U.C.C. § 594(1) ("'The parties if they so intend can conclude a contract for sale even though the
price is not settled.").
118 Id.
119 Id.

120Although it is asserted that "reasonable price" does not necessarily mean "fair-market value,"
U.S. courts will typically look to "prices charged by other sellers of similar products," which, when
taken altogether and average, is the very definition of a "market price," in most situations. See
generally 67 AM. JUR. 2D SALES § 280; TCP Industries, Inc. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 661 F.2d 542 (6th
Cir. 1981) (nothing that a reasonable price is not necessarily market value). In any case, the easily
obtainable market value of the goods in the contract at issue provides a simple, low-cost, low-time
method of determining the reasonable price of goods in a contract that does not specify the price
term. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 54, at 96 ("To estimate a reasonable price, courts can largely
rely on market information..."); Coltec Industries, Inc. v. Elliot Turbocharger Group Inc., Nos.
CIV. A. 99-1400, 99-MC-36 1999 WL 695870, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 9, 1999) ("[U]nder ordinary
circumstances the reasonable price will be the market price for particular merchandise.") (citing
Kuss Machine Tool & Die Co. v. EI-Tronics, 143 A.2d 38,40 (Pa. 1958)).
121 This is not so much an "economic" assertion, as it is an a priorilogical assumption about the
rational decisions of economic actors and the very nature of the market. If the majority of parties
negotiated for a price significantly lower or higher than a product's "market value," then the market
value of those products would actually become that lower or higher price. Therefore, it logically
follows that the price which a majority of parties bargain for is the almost always the "market
value," and conversely that the "market value" is almost always the price which a majority of
parties bargain for.
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contemporaneous market pricing is not difficult to ascertain, meaning that this
rule will not result in large ex-post litigation costs for the parties or the publicly
subsidized court system.1 22 The U.C.C.'s "Open Price Term" majoritarian
default rule is economically efficient.
Article 55 of the CISG contains an almost identical majoritarian
default rule for contracts lacking price terms.123 Article 55 states:
Where a contract has been validly concluded but does not
expressly or implicitly fix or make provision for determining
the price, the parties are considered

.

. . to have impliedly

made reference to the price generally charged at the time of
the conclusion of the contract for such goods1 24sold under
comparable circumstances in the trade concerned.
This language mirrors the U.C.C.'s "reasonable price" language, and,
in practice, allows the court to supply the contract with a price term with the
same market-value analysis as is used in these situations under the U.C.C.
Thus, the CISG and the U.C.C. both remedy missing
price terms with the same
1 25
economically efficient majoritarian default rule.
Quantity Terms
Considering that quantity terms are considered equally as important to
contracts as price terms, one would expect the default rules of quantity terms to
be similar to those of price terms. However, neither the U.C.C nor the CISG
treat price and quantity terms in the same fashion.
U.C.C. § 2-201(1) has already been analyzed as a statute of frauds
provision. This section also includes the U.C.C.'s default rule on missing
quantity terms. It states, "[T]he contract is not enforceable under this paragraph
beyond the quantity of goods shown in such writing." 1 26 This rule operates in
such a way that if the parties do not supply any quantity in their contract, the
contract is unenforceable. As opposed to the price term default of a "reasonable
price," the quantity term default is effectively zero."

122

In other words, this default rule results in low transaction costs and low social costs.
supra note 1, art. 54.

123 CISG,
124

Id.

125

See also Ayres & Gertner, supra note 54, at 96 ("The U.C.C.'s reasonable-price standard can be.

. reconciled with the received wisdom that defaults should be set at what the parties would have
contracted for.").
126

U.C.C. § 2-201(1) (1978).
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Clearly this rule is not majoritarian. A majority of parties would not
want to go to the trouble of contracting just to have their contract
not enforced
127
terms.
quantity
express
include
not
did
writing
because their
This rule is, in fact, a classic example of a penalty default rule. When
the parties fail to specify a quantity, they are effectively specifying the quantity
as "zero." Because the provision provides that the law will only enforce the
contract insofar as the amount written in the contract, the failure to specify any
amount results in the entire contract being rendered unenforceable. This harsh
penalty causes the parties to take special care to contract around the rule and
include quantity terms in all of their contracts for fear of the penalty default
rendering their entire contract unenforceable. 128 The exorbitant ex-post costs of
determining a "reasonable quantity" term to be supplied in the contract would
render a majoritarian default economically inefficient. Therefore, the U.C.C.'s
zero-quantity penalty default efficiently shifts the costs of determining the
quantity to those who have the best information to make this determination at
the lowest cost-the parties to the contract. 129
Article 14 of the CISG is clear when it precludes a valid contract from
130
being formed (and thus enforced) when it does not include quantity terms.
Article 14 states that if no provision providing for quantity terms is supplied,
there is no offer, and therefore, no valid contract is formed.' 3' The CISG does
not provide a quantity term provision similar to the price term provision in
Article 55. This results in the CISG's Article 14 quantity default rule operating
exactly like the zero-quantity penalty default in the U.C.C. by rendering
contracts without quantity terms unenforceable under the CISG. Although less
clear than their similarities in price term defaults, the CISG and the U.C.C. both
contain functionally identical, economically efficient zero-quantity default
rules.
127 Ayres & Gertner, supra note 54, at 96 ("Obviously, the parties would not have gone to the

expense of contracting with the intention that nothing be exchanged.").
28 Id. ("The zero-quantity rule can be justified because it is cheaper or the parties to establish the
quantity term beforehand than for the courts to determine after the fact what the parties would have
wanted.").
129

id.

130 CISG, supra note 1, art. 14.

131Id. It may be argued that Article 14 also requires definite price terms, rendering invalid any
contract allegedly formed after an offer without definite price term. However, Article 14
specifically states that the offer may "implicitly" fix terms for the quantity and price. Article 55
explains the seemingly cryptic idea of "implicit price terms," when it states that a contract not
specifying any price terms at all is assumed to have "impliedly made reference to the price generally
charged at the time of the conclusion of the contract..." The CISG contains no analogous
provision explaining "implicit quantity terms," which most likely means that a complete lack of
quantity terms renders an offer and the subsequent contract invalid.
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C. The CISG Is Economically Efficient
After studying what are arguably the five most important contractual
concepts/provisions, it is clear that the U.C.C. is economically efficient in its
treatment of four out of the five provisions,13 2 and the CISG is economically
efficient in its treatment of three out of the five provisions. 33 By themselves,
the numbers seem to suggest that because the U.C.C. is the usual set of default
rules applied to the sale of goods by U.S. businesses, and because the U.C.C. is
slightly more efficient than the CISG, the CISG is undesirable. However, these
numbers may be misleading. Had there been an extreme disparity between the
amount of efficient provisions in the U.C.C. and the CISG, the answer would
have been clear. But a more comprehensive analysis of the comparative
importance between these five contract provisions/concepts could provide
a
34
better picture of the desirability of the CISG as compared to the U.C.C.
As it stands today, the fact that the CISG has only one less
economically efficient provision than the U.C.C. can be seen as a testament of
the CISG's ability to unify disparate legal systems under one common set of
rules (which is an economically efficient accomplishment in itself). Therefore,
it would ultimately seem that the CISG contains enough economic efficiency in
its important provisions to render it a highly desirable set of default rules for
U.S. businesses involved in the international sale of goods.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's holding in Medellin made many legal scholars
and jurists (including the Medellin dissent) fearful that numerous multi-lateral
treaties in force in the United States would now be considered non-selfexecuting. The CISG is one of these treaties. After studying the Medellin

132These four are the parol evidence rule, the foreseeability of damages rules, the price terms, and
the quantity terms.
133These three are the statute of frauds, the price terms, and the quantity terms.
134 Furthermore, it could be argued that the five provisions/concepts explored and analyzed in this
study are not the only ones that should be characterized as the "most important contractual
provisions/concepts." For examples see Catherine Piche, The Convention on Contractsfor the
InternationalSale of Goods And the Uniform Commercial Code Remedies in Light of Remedial
PrinciplesRecognized Under U.S. Law: Are the Remedies of GrantingAdditional Time to the
Defaulting Partiesand of Reduction of PriceFairand Efficient Ones?, 28 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM.
REG. 519 (2003) (discussing and comparing the efficiency of the perfect tender, fundamental
breach, and Nachfrist rules in the U.C.C. and the CISG); Avery W. Katz, Remedies for Breach of
Contract Under the CISG, 25 INT'L REV. L. & EcON. 378 (2006) (discussing the three main default
remedial rules of the CISG).
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majority's holding and its interpretations, it is clear that these scholars and
jurists can rest easy with the knowledge that that the CISG is safely ensconced
in our laws as a self-executing treaty. Even under the Medellin Court's new
standard, the CISG is still considered self-executing, and is still the default rules
applicable to U.S. businesses involved in the international sale of goods.
But do U.S. businesses want the CISG? For strictly domestic
transactions of goods, U.S. businesses are subject to the U.C.C. The U.C.C.'s
provisions have been shown to be very economically efficient. But the CISG's
ability to harmonize and unify international sales law, thus opening up the
international sales market to more U.S. businesses, plus the CISG's relative
economic efficiency make the CISG a fairly desirable set of default rules for
U.S. businesses. Hopefully, future empirical studies and surveys on the CISG
and its popularity with U.S. businesses will highlight and emphasize the
efficiency of the CISG for U.S. businesses, and the CISG will take its rightful
place as an indispensable and beneficial instrument of international sales law.
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